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THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
OF 1969: IS THE FACT OF COMPLIANCE A
PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION?
Roger M. Leed*
Given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive
requirements of the Act, we believe that courts have an ob-
ligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits.'
While shared by four other circuits,2 the Eighth Circuit's view
expressed in the foregoing quotation, that the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)3 authorizes substantive review
* B.A., 1961, Harvard University; J.D., 1967, University of Michigan;
member, Washington State Bar; admitted to practice before the Supreme Court
of the United States; member of the firm Schroeter, Jackson, Goldmark & Bender,
P.S., Seattle; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law;
member, Special Committee on Environmental Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion; Vice-President, Washington Environmental Council; counsel for intervening
community groups in Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974).
1. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298
(8th Cir. 1972).
2. Substantive NEPA review was approved in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123 [6 ERC 1513] (5th Cir. 1974); Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 371 F.
Supp. 1291 [6 ERC 1305] (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d
946 [5 ERC 1920] (7th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council of North Carolina v.
Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 [4 ERC 2039] (4th Cir. 1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coord.
Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 [2 ERC 1779] (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). See also Comment, Judicial Review
of Fact Issues Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 51 ORE. L. REv.
408 (1972). For convenience to the environmental practitioner, citations to the
Environment Reporter (ERC) are supplied where appropriate.




Sec. 101. [42 U.S.C. § 4331] (a) The Congress, recognizing the
profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components
of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of pop-
ulation growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource
exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recog-
nizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining envi-
ronmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, de-
clares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in co-
operation with State and local governments, and other concerned public
and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, in-
cluding financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to fos-
ter and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions
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of agency decisions, is not unanimous. Courts in the Second,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits profess to be skeptical about the avail-
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill
the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future gener-
ations of Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practica-
ble means, consistent with other essential considerations of national pol-
icy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and
resources to the end that the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of
the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environ-
ment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other unde-
sirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of
our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environ-
ment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of
life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach
the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
(c) The Congless recognizes that each pezson should enjoy a
healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to con-
tribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment.
See. 102. [42 U.S.C. § 4332]. The Congress authorizes and directs
that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered
in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all agencies
of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will
insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the
environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which
may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consulta-
tion with the Council on Environmental Quality established by title
II of this Act, which will insure that presently unquantified environ-
mental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration
in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considera-
tions;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by
the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal of-
ficial shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with re-
spect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such state-
ment and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State,
and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce en-
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ability of substantive review and focus instead on the procedural
aspects of NEPA compliance.4
In analyzing NEPA, courts and commentators have tended
to employ the conventional distinction between substance and pro-
cedure.5  Sections 101 and 102(1)-setting forth the broad
remedial goals of the legislation-are considered the substantive
portions, while section 102(2) is labeled procedural. The latter
section is best known for its requirement that a detailed environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) be prepared by any agency pro-
posing a major federal project which may significantly affect the
environment. The substantive portions of NEPA establish a com-
mitment by the federal government to use all practicable means
to enhance the quality of the environment. The broad goals of
vironmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the
Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by
section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and shall accompany the
proposal through the existing agency review processes;
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to
recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves un-
resolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources;
(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of envi-
ronmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy
of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolu-
tions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation
in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's
world environment;
(F) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institu-
tions, and individuals, advice and information useful in restoring,
maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the environment;
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning
and development of resource-oriented projects; and(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established
by title II of this Act.
4. See City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929, 940 [4 ERC
1646] (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (three judge court), where the court said:
Once it is determined in any particular instance that there has been good
faith compliance with those procedures [of NEPAl, we seriously ques-
tion whether much remains for a reviewing court.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 [6 ERC 1068] (9th
Cir. 1973):
We do not read the National Environmental Protection Act to give to
the courts the ultimate authority to approve or disapprove construction
of a properly authorized project where an adequate EIS has been pre-
pared and circulated in accordance with the NEPA requirements.
487 F.2d at 822 n.13. Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 [3 ERC 1418]
(10th Cir. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972). But see Jicarilla Apache
Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 [4 ERC 1933] (9th Cir. 1973). See also Save
Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 [4 ERC 1941] (5th Cir. 1973); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 [4 ERC 1850] (6th Cir. 1972),
371 F. Supp. 1004 [6 ERC 1008] (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466
[6 ERC 1367] (6th Cir. 1974).
5. Garrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second
Generation of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 So. DAK.
L. REV. 279 (1974); Note, Judicial Review, Delegation, and Public Hearings Un-
der N.E.P.A., 1974 DUKE L.J. 423; Comment, National Environmental Policy
Act: What Standard of Judicial Review? 39 J. AIR. L. & COM. 643 (1973).
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the substantive portions are to be incorporated into the activities
of the federal government by means of the procedural require-
ments of the Act.'
Though it is arguable whether or not the distinction between
substantive and procedural review makes a difference in the
outcome of a given case, the willingness of a court to extend sub-
stantive review may be an index of judicial commitment to rigor-
ous enforcement of NEPA. Those courts which approve judicial
review of agency action on the merits base their position on the
language of NEPA and on the underlying congressional policy.7
Some courts have carried out their reviewing function under
NEPA as though they were employing "substantive" review, but
have maintained they were confining themselves to procedural
questions.' Despite often conflicting pronouncements as to what
will be reviewed under NEPA, and as to the scope of that review,
it is apparent that courts have devised several different routes for
reaching factual issues presented in NEPA suits, while paying lip
service to the principles of deference to agency expertise and dis-
cretion.'
This article will examine both the scope and standard of judi-
cial review under NEPA and will suggest that review of the fact
6. See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). See Anderson, NEPA
IN THE COURTS (1973) for an explanation of the procedural workings of NEPA
and how a NEPA suit reaches the courts, as well as for extensive analysis of judi-
cial interpretations of NEPA.
7. Section 102 [42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970)] provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall
be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth
in this chapter ..... .[Emphasis added.]
See also U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2769-70 (91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969).
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297 [4 ERC
1721] (8th Cir. 1972), the court stated:
The language of NEPA, as well as its legislative history, make it clear
that the Act is more than an environmental full-disclosure law. NEPA
was intended to effect substantive changes in decisionmaking.
8. See, e.g., 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Bums, 372 F. Supp. 223 [6 ERC 1275]
(D. Conn. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 [5 ERC 1033]
(S.D. Tex. 1973); Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 [4 ERC 1487] (W.D.
Wash. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d
677 [7 ERC 1048] (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
9. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004
[4 ERC 1008] (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 [4 ERC 1367] (6th Cir.
1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 [5 ERC 1033] (S.D. Tex.
1973); Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 [4 ERC 1487] (W.D. Wash. 1972),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC
1048] (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc). See also Briggs, NEPA as a Means to Preserve
and Improve the Environment-The Substantive Review, 15 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 667 (1974); Comment, National Environmental Policy Act; What Stand-
ard of Judicial Review?, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 643 (1973); Comment, Judicial
Review of Fact Issues Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 51 ORE. L.
REV. 408 (1972).
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of section 101 and section 102(1) procedural compliance is the
functional equivalent of substantive review. It will also suggest
an analytical framework for rationalizing the results, but unfor-
tunately not the language, of NEPA decisions.
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF NEPA: APPLICABILITY
OF THE OVERTON PARK CASE
One of the most tantalizing questions posed by NEPA, a law
characterized by one noted jurist as "broad, yet opaque,"'10 is
whether agency compliance is subject to judicial review. An ar-
gument against review may be made on policy grounds by assert-
ing that courts are not equipped to deal with the complex scientific
and engineering issues involved in the many projects subject to
NEPA.
One court, in an early decision, ventured that NEPA simply
was not susceptible of judicial enforcement. 1' But it was soon
settled that NEPA creates obligations which are judicially enforce-
able. 1' Courts which regularly deal with the complexities of
patent, antitrust, and government contract litigation cannot be
intimidated by dam projects and freeways, nor do courts operate
under the illusion that administrative agencies have a monopoly
on expertise.' 3 Also, the mandate of Congress contained in sec-
tion 102(1) of NEPA is addressed to the courts as well as to other
agencies, and therefore requires the courts to afford review,' 4 al-
though it leaves open the question of the standard to be applied.
A second question, which is still unsettled, is whether
environmental protection i is of such importance to the public
10. City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 [3 ERC 1570]
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (three judge court, Friendly, J.).
11. Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 ERC 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Cf. San Francisco
Tomorrow v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 77, 81 [4 ERC 1065] (N.D. Cal. 1972),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, [4 ERC 2028] (9th Cir. 1973); Sherry v. Algonquin
Gas Co., [4 ERC 1713] (D. Mass. 1972).
12. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
13. Judge Oakes (dissenting) observed, in Scenic Hudson Preservation Con-
ference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 484 [3 ERC 1232] (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 926 (1972):
[W]hile judicial deference to administrative expertise is required, not ev-
ery agency is expert in every aspect of science, technology, aesthetics
or human behavior. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 476 (1951) .. . ; see L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative
Action 576 et seq. (1965). As Professor Jaffe has said, '. . . expertness
is not a magic wand which can be indiscriminately waved over the cor-
pus of an agency's findings to preserve them from review.'
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) provides, in part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall
be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth
in this chapter. ...
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interest that NEPA necessitates the application of a stricter stand-
ard of judicial scrutiny than is usually applied to administrative
actions. 15 Many courts have treated NEPA review as founded on
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).' 6 As announced in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe," judicial review
under the APA is governed by the "substantial inquiry" test.
As a general matter, a court may review an administrative
action unless there is a statute forbidding review or the action falls
within the narrow exception for matters committed to agency dis-
cretion. The test for agency discretion is whether the statute in
question is "'drawn in such broad terms that . . . there is no law
to apply.'"18 While NEPA is broad, it is certainly not so broad
that courts cannot find "law to apply." All agency action is sub-
ject to the "generally applicable standards of section 706," which
15. As one commentator has written:
[I]t can be safely said that the standard of review applied by the district
courts has in most cases been more searching than in other areas of ad-
ministrative law.
Yarrington, The National Environmental Policy Act, 4 ENVIRONMENT REPORTER
MONOGRAPH No. 17 at 40. On the other hand, a district court recently observed:
The passage of NEPA has yet to be shown by authoritative construction
to have broadened this limited grant of power to the judiciary to review
the substantive merits of agency action.
1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 240 [6 ERC 1275, 1286-87] (D.
Conn. 1974).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970). Of particu!ar relevance is section 706:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret coIstitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and con-
clusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or im-
munity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be
takei of the rule of prejudicial error.
17. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The plaintiffs in Overton Park challenged the Sec-
retary of Transportation's decision to bisect Overton Park in Memphis, Tennessee
with Interstate 1-40. Though the case predates NEPA, the interpretation of the
APA and judicial review of agency decisions via the APA is of critical importance
to NEPA's enforcement.
18. Id. at 410, citing S. REP. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1945).
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"require the reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry." 19
The Supreme Court described this inquiry as "a thorough, prob-
ing, in depth review."20
In invoking the section 706(2)(A), (B), (C), or (D)2 sub-
stantial inquiry test, the reviewing court must first decide whether
the agency acted within the scope of its authority. This deter-
mination involves inquiry as to the extent of the agency's author-
ity, and then into the matter of whether the agency decision is
within the established boundaries of that authority.22 The arbi-
trary and capricious standard of section 706(2)(A) next requires
a court to "consider whether the decision was based on a con-
sideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been clear
error of judgment. ' 23  Finally, review entails a determination as
to whether necessary procedural steps were followed.2 4
Under section 706 of the APA, administrative action may be
set aside if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law, '' 5 or "if the action
fail[s] to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional require-
ments."2  Broader review is available, under the section 706(2)
(E)27 substantial evidence test, for agency rulemaking and actions
based on a public adjudicatory hearing.28 Broader yet is de novo
review provided for under section 706(2)(F).29  Such review is
appropriate only if the agency action is adjudicatory in nature and
agency fact finding procedures are inadequate, or if a case arises
where issues not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to
enforce nonadjudicatory agency action.30
In setting forth guidelines for agency review under the APA,
the Supreme Court has extended to agencies the benefit of a
"presumption of regularity,"' 3' and has cautioned reviewing courts
that the "ultimate standard of review is a narrow one," which does
not empower the court "to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency." 32
19. 401 U.S. at 415.
20. id.
21. See text accompanying notes 25-26 infra.
22. 401 U.S. at 415-16.
23. Id. at 416.
24. Id. at 417.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
26. Id. §§ 706(2)(B), (C), (D).
27. See note 16 supra.
28. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414
(1971).
29. See note 16 supra.
30. 401 U.S. at 415.
31. Id. at 415.
32. id. at 416.
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To courts which view actions arising under NEPA as gov-
erned by the APA, Overton Park, read together with Camp v.
Pitts13 ordains the scope and the standard of review. The scope of
the "plenary review"34 under the "substantial inquiry" test pre-
scribed by Overton Park is to a certain extent discretionary, but
at a minimum it must include "the full administrative record."
35
Additionally, a court may require agency officials to give testi-
mony explaining their actions. 6
Some courts have found it unnecessary to look to the APA
for reviewing authority, and instead have viewed NEPA as pre-
senting a federal question, reviewable under Title 28 U.S.C.,
section 133 1. 7  It has been suggested that the Overton Park
criteria do not apply to review founded on section 1331.8
The courts seldom attempt to distinguish between the under-
lying substantive agency action and the administrative steps in-
volved in procedural compliance with NEPA. Such a distinction
was made by the Tenth Circuit, however, in National Helium
Corp. v. Morton.s9 In that court's view, Overton Park does not
govern the scope and standard of review when the issue is com-
pliance with section 102(2)(C) of NEPA (the environmental
impact statement provision). 40
33. 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (per curiam). The Comptroller of the Currency's
administrative decision to deny an application for certification of a new federal
bank was reviewed in Camp by the Supreme Court under the APA. In this proc-
ess, the Court again had occasion to interpret the scope of review of agency ac-
tion under the APA.




37. See, e.g., Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 [5 ERC 1654] (Ist Cir. 1973);
Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 [5 ERC 1283] (W.D. Va.
1973), afI'd, 484 F.2d 453 [6 ERC 1336] (4th Cir. 1973).
. 38. See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 [6 ERC 1001]
(10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 [6 ERC 1622] (1974). The actions
of the Secretary of the Interior in terminating contracts with helium-producing
plants were challenged as failing to comply with NEPA. While the court found
NEPA applicable, it decided there had been compliance-at least as far as any
court was permitted to review the agency's actions.
39. 486 F.2d 995 [6 ERC 1001] (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
993 [6 ERC 1622] (1974).
40. The court conceded that Overton Park governs review of agency actions,
but reasoned that review of an EIS for adequacy is not review of an agency's ac-
tion. Thus the court concluded that it was free under NEPA to devise its own
standard of review and proceeded to do so:
This case [Overton Park] did not, however, involve the preparation of
an environmental impact statement. This was a review of the decision
of the Secretary of Transportation in respect to the building of a high-
way through a park. This was in truth 'agency action' . ...
In assessing the adequacy of the impact statement, we are not here re-
viewing . . . agency action within the meaning of section 706 of the
APA. Rather, we are concerned with the NEPA requirement which is,
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Thus, despite Overton Park, the courts have developed diver-
gent positions-as evidenced by the National Helium case--on
the scope and standard of review under NEPA. Courts which
have declined to apply ,the Overton Park standards in NEPA cases
have done so for apparently contradictory reasons. It has been
suggested, on the one hand, that those standards are too restric-
tive41 and, on the other hand, that 'they invite excessive judicial
intervention.42 Thus, Overton Park is not the end of this discus-
sion, but rather the point of departure.
DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES
In approaching -the question of judicial review under NEPA,
it is helpful first to classify the NEPA decisions 'according to
the types of issues presented. The earliest cases frequently in-
volved claims that, as a matter of law, NEPA did not apply to the
particular agency action in question.43 However, NEPA litigation
soon began placing increasing emphasis on factual questions.44
NEPA suits today may involve a number of complex issues of law
or fact, or both. On an imaginary continuum between issues of
law and issues of fact the following way stations may be identified:
A. The agency contends compliance with section 102(2)
(C) is not required because the action does not "significantly"
affect the quality of the environment. Section 102(2)(C) re-
quires that an environmental impact statement be filed when an
agency proposes action "significantly affecting the quality of the
to be sure, a prerequisite for agency action, but is not agency action it-
self. The trial court's conclusion that it was required by Overton Park
to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard was, in our view, errone-
ous .... The rule of reason is a more appropriate standard where the
sufficiency of the statement is being tested.
486 F.2d at 1001-02.The Tenth Circuit's reasoning may be criticized, since Overton Park was con-
cerned with review of the Secretary of Transportation's procedural compliance
with section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1653(f) (1970), and section 18(a) of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1968,
23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
41. See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244
[5 ERC 18441 (10th Cir. 1973).
42. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463 [3 ERC 1232] (2d Cir. 1971).
43. See, e.g., Brooks v. Volpe, 319 F. Supp. 90 [2 ERC 1004], 329 F. Supp.
118 [2 ERC 1571] (W.D. Wash. 1971) (defendants successfully claimed ad-
vanced stage of construction bars NEPA applicability), rev'd, 460 F.2d 1193
13 ERC 1858] (9th Cir. 1971); Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 [3 ERC 1458](D.C. Cir. 1971) (defendants' contention that Refuse Act permit issuance was
exempt from NEPA rejected).
44. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 [5 ERC 1033] (S.D.
Tex. 1973), which may be the most factually detailed (and longest) NEPA opin-
ion to date. The court observed that the record reviewed was contained in thir-
teen book boxes containing some 246 items.
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human environment."4 5 The key word here is "significantly." In
Hanly v. Kleindienst,46 the Second Circuit perceived the meaning
of "significantly" as presenting both a question of law for the
court, and a question of fact committed to agency discretion,4 7
both of which are reviewable under the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard discussed in Overton Park.48  The Tenth and Fifth Cir-
cuits have opted for a "standard of reasonableness" which imports
little if any deference to agency threshold decisions that no EIS
is necessary. In general, the courts tend to scrutinize carefully
an agency decision not to prepare an EIS.4
B. The agency's environmental impact statement, or the
action itself, is challenged on procedural grounds. Paragraphs
(2)(A), (2)(B) and (2)(D) of section 102 establish procedural
requirements which are in addition to, and independent of,
the environmental impact statement requirement of paragraph
(2)(C). Besides calling for an EIS when major actions signifi-
cantly affecting the environment are proposed, section 102 man-
dates that federal agencies "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary
approach to insure integrated use of the natural and social sciences
and the environmental design arts in planning and in decision-
making which may have an impact on man's environment." 50  To
achieve this objective, the section directs that methods and proce-
dures be developed "to insure that unquantified environmental
amenities will be considered in the agency decision-making pro-
cess," 51 and that alternatives to the proposed action be studied,
developed and described. Failure to comply with these additional
requirements may be assigned as grounds for overturning agency
actions. 5 '
It is well established that an EIS is subject to procedural chal-
lenge for failure to comply with section 102(2)(C) 53 and the
45. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970).
46. 471 F.2d 823 [4 ERC 1785] (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973).
47. Id. at 829. See also Wyoming Outdoor Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d
1244 [5 ERC 1844] (10th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 [4 ERC
1152] (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
48. 471 F.2d at 830.
49. See Wyoming Outdoor Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 [5 ERC
1844] (10th Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 [4 ERC
1941] (5th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 92-94 infra.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970); see note 2 supra.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004
[6 ERC 1008] (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 [6 ERC 1367] (6th Cir.
1974).
53. See, e.g., 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223 [6 ERC 1275]
(D. Conn. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 [5 ERC 1033]
(S.D. Tex. 1973); Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 [4 ERC 1487] (W.D.
Wash. 1972), af 'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d
677 [7 ERC 1048] (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
[Vol. 15
1975] NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 313
courts are beginning to fashion per se criteria for invalidity, includ-
ing: (1) failure to disclose relevant information;5 (2) failure to
consider reasonable alternatives;55 (3) lack of adequate detail (in-
dicated by a perfunctory statement which contains too much
conclusory language, is superficial, or is merely a justification for
the proposed action);56 (4) failure to respond adequately to
agency and public comment;5 7 (5) failure to include responsible
opposing scientific views;58 (6) failure to specify and include in-
formation recognized as appropriate for particular types of pro-
jects;5" and (7) failure to demonstrate adequate "consideration"
of pertinent factors.60
C. The agency's EIS is challenged on substantive grounds.
There may be no room for a meaningful distinction between a
substantive and a procedural challenge to an EIS.01 The Ninth
Circuit seems specifically opposed to such a distinction, finding
that the "detailed" statement required by section 102(2)(C) of
NEPA compels an agency to file a "substantively" complete EIS
54. See 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Bums, 372 F. Supp. 223 [6 ERC 1275] (D.
Conn. 1974).
55. Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 [4 ERC
1886] (2d Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827 [3 ERC 15581 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F.
Supp. 223 [6 ERC 1275] (D. Conn. 1974); Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp.
517 [5 ERC 17901 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
56. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United
States, 371 F. Supp. 1291 [6 ERC 1305] (D.C. Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 [4 ERC 1829] (8th Cir. 1972); City of New York
v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 [3 ERC 1570] (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Daly v.
Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252 [4 ERC 1481] (W.D. Wash. 1972).
57. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United
States, 371 F. Supp. 1291 [6 ERC 1305] (D.D.C. 1974). See Lathan v. Volpe,
350 F. Supp. 262 [4 ERC 1487] (W.D. Wash. 1972), a! 'd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC 1048] (9th Cir. 1974) (en
banc).
58. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 [3 ERC
1126] (D.C. Cir. 1971).
59. E.g., Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517 [5 ERC 1790] (N.D. Ala.
1973); Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 [4 ERC 1487] (W.D. Wash. 1972),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC
1048] (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
60. See, e.g., 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223 [6 ERC 1275]
(D. Conn. 1974); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 [4 ERC 1350] (C.D. Cal.
1972), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Keith v. California Highway
Comm'n, [6 ERC 1097] (9th Cir. 1973).
61. See Comment, Evolving Judicial Standards Under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act and the Challenge of the Alaska Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592
passim [hereinafter cited as Comment, Evolving Judicial Standards]. Judge
Breitenstein apparently recognized such a distinction in National Helium Corp.
v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1006 (10th Cir. 1973) (concurring opinion). Joining
the majority in rejecting the contention that an EIS is reviewable on its merits,
Judge Breitenstein stated:
The courts should not second-guess the scientists, experts, economists,
and planners who make the environmental statement.
Id. at 1006.
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in order to comply with this procedural requirement of NEPA.6 z
It would seem, nonetheless, that an impact statement which
is in full compliance with NEPA's minimum procedural require-
ments, but contains a material factual misstatement or omission,
should be rejected. The fact that an EIS has been filed and cir-
culated in procedural compliance with NEPA does not guarantee
that the environmental impact has been thoroughly studied and
candidly disclosed. Thus, some courts have examined the agen-
cy's EIS on its merits. 3
D. The agency action itself is challenged on substantive
grounds. Although failure to comply with section 101 of NEPA
could be characterized as a procedural rather than a substantive
violation, the courts have elected to use the substantive termino-
logy.64 Regardless of whether they treat section 101 compliance
as reviewable, these courts have said that what is at stake in section
101 review is the agency's substantive decision to carry out a pro-
ject.65 As a result, the circuits have disagreed over the scope of,
and standard to be applied to, section 101 review, making uniform
application of NEPA impossible.66 It is the premise of this article
that a uniform approach to section 101 review could be reached
if review of agency compliance with section 101 were character-
ized as procedural, not as "substantive."
A recent en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit, Lathan v.
Brinegar67 indicates that the courts are beginning to appreciate
that all questions of NEPA compliance may be characterized as
procedural. Lathan involved the proposed construction of a major
freeway, 1-90, across Lake Washington, and through the Central
Area of Seattle. One issue at stake was whether the district court
62. See Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC 1048, 1058] (9th Cir. 1974)
(en banc).
63. See, e.g., 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223 [6 ERC 1575] (D.
Conn. 1974).
The adequacy of an EIS prepared by the Connecticut Department of Trans-
portation for a portion of 1-291 around Hartford was challenged. The court re-
viewed the EIS in great detail and ordered an injunction until the statement could
be brought up to the standards required by NEPA. See also Montgomery v. Ellis,
364 F. Supp. 517 [5 ERC 1790] (N.D. Ala. 1973). The EIS on file for a stream
channelization project of the Soil Conservation Service of the United States De-
partment of Agriculture was examined by the court and found to be inadequately
prepared.
64. See, e.g., Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 [4 ERC 2039]
(4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289,
297-98 [4 ERC 1097] (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Calvert
Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 [2 ERC 1779]
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
65. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
66. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
67. 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC 1048] (1974).
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had erred in finding the EIS legally insufficient. The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed that finding, saying:
• ..NEPA is essentially a procedural statute. Its purpose
is to assure that, by following the procedures that it pre-
scribes, agencies will be fully aware of the impact of their de-
cisions when they make them. The procedures required by
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c), are designed to secure the
accomplishment of the vital purpose of NEPA. That result
can be achieved only if the prescribed procedures are faith-
fully followed; grudging, pro forma compliance will not do.68
Judicial perceptions of the appropriate standard for judicial
review may differ depending upon which of the above situations
is before the court. The extent of the procedural formalities at-
tending the preparation of the administrative record also has a
bearing on the standard of review employed. Where a full adjudi-
catory proceeding is involved, as in Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Commission,6" it is necessary for the
court to address the standard of review in terms of the statute
underlying the proceeding, an approach which blurs the signifi-
cance of the decision as far as NEPA is concerned. Where the
agency action does not involve an adjudicatory hearing, but is in-
formal or ex parte, a court may apply the Overton Park standard,70
or it may search NEPA for guidance in devising a different
standard. 71
The particular standard of review settled upon may be less
important to effective judicial supervision of agency action than
the scope of review. It will be an unusual situation indeed when
an agency prepares an EIS which so indicts its proposed action
that the EIS itself will convince a court that the agency has com-
mitted a "clear error of judgment. ' 72  If the agency has over-
looked important facts or scientific opinion, or ignored significant
environmental impacts, or failed to weigh reasonable alternatives,
the court can hardly find a NEPA violation, unless it is willing
to expand the scope of review beyond the EIS and accept proof
of such shortcomings from outside the record.
68. Id. at 693 [7 ERC at 1058].
69. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453
F.2d 463 [3 ERC 1232] (2d Cir. 1971) (FPC hearings and compliance with
NEPA were challenged as plaintiffs opposed the construction of the Storm King
power project on the Hudson River in New York).
70. E.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 [5 ERC 1737] (W.D. Tex.
1973), af 'd in relevant part, 502 F.2d 43, 64 [7 ERC 1033] (5th Cir. 1974)
(testing decision by Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to guarantee
bonds to be floated to finance a proposed Title VII new community).
71. This is the approach taken by the Tenth Circuit in National Helium Corp.
v. Morton, 486 F.2d 994 [6 ERC at 1008] (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 993 (1973).
72. 401 U.S. at 416.
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THE SCOPE OF REVIEW UNDER NEPA
Overton Park's direction that the court consider the full ad-
ministrative record has generally been respected by courts review-
ing agency actions for NEPA compliance. 3 If NEPA itself is to
be regarded as establishing jurisdiction for judicial review, then
logically the scope of review may be broader, but certainly not
more restricted, than that authorized by Overton Park for APA
review.
Review confined exclusively to the environmental impact
statement will seriously inhibit judicial supervision of the agency
decision-making process. Looking only at the EIS, a court would
be hard put to determine, for example, whether the agency was
acting within the scope of its authority or whether it had ignored
important adverse environmental effects. Neither the arbitrary
and capricious test, nor any stricter standard of judicial review,
can meaningfully be applied to an agency decision unless the court
receives evidence as to how the decision-making process was con-
ducted. The scope of review must be broad enough to embrace
evidence which will impeach a "pro forma" administrative record.
Review of section 101 compliance cannot be based on the
EIS alone. An EIS can hardly be received as evidence with re-
spect to substantive issues affecting the agency action unless the
hearsay rule is disregarded. 4 But if a court nonetheless accepts
an EIS as proof of the matters asserted it must also receive contra-
dictory evidence which meets traditional standards of trustworthi-
ness.
An EIS may not be received as evidence of the nature of
and reasons for the agency decision. The EIS is a decision-
making document, a "working paper"7 5 and not the equivalent of
agency findings and conclusions.76 Since the agency must make
its decision with the statement before it, the statement must pre-
cede, not follow, the agency decision. The administrative record
offered to the reviewing court thus must contain not only the EIS
73. E.g., Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d
664 [6 ERC 1063] (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1283
[5 ERC 1654, 1655] (1st Cir. 1973).
74. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938), the
Supreme Court observed that "[m]ere uncortoboiated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence." See Camero v. United States, 345 F.2d 798 (Ct.
Cl. 1965).
75. Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 352 F. Supp. 50, 55 [4 ERC
1760] (N.D. Cal. 1970).
76. See Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v.
United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1299-3000 & n.25 [6 ERC 1305, 1311 & n.25]
(D.C. Cir. 1974); but cf. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 [3 ERC 1280, 1286]
(4th Cir. 1971) (where the court said that in an EIS, an agency must "explicate
fully its course of inquiry, its analysis and its reasoning").
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and all supporting documentation, but also the agency decision,
and whatever record exists to support that decision.
When the agency decision is not based on a formal record,
the scope of review must extend even beyond the "full administra-
tive record. '7 7 That record often will be brief or non-existent for
informal, ex parte actions. Even when it contains environmental
assessments, reports and studies, the record will usually not reflect
the full course of the agency's reasoning and decision-making pro-
cess. When this is the case, the reviewing court will have to re-
ceive de novo evidence in order to determine whether the agency
engaged in full and good faith "individualized consideration and
balancing of environmental factors. 71 8
Even where the agency has held an adjudicatory hearing to
which all litigants were parties, the full record will ordinarily not
suffice to enable the court to reach both procedural and substan-
tive NEPA issues. While the hearing record may touch on some
fact questions relevant to agency compliance with NEPA, it may
not deal with all the procedural or substantive issues pertaining
to the process of drafting an environmental impact statement, and
probably should not do so. To date there has been little judicial
inclination to respect without question an agency's determination
that it has complied with NEPA.79  Evidence outside the admin-
istrative record will usually be essential to make out even per se
deficiencies in an EIS, such as failure to consider reasonable alter-
natives, failure to discuss opposing scientific views, omission of
adverse data and views, and failure to list all adverse environmental
impacts. Only the expectation that a court will admit and consider
such evidence will force agencies to adhere to the strict standard
of NEPA compliance mandated by Congress. If agencies can ex-
77. This phrase is from Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 420 (1971). In National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78
[5 ERC 1545] (D. Kan. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 995 [6 ERC
1001] (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1973), the Court defined the scope
of review under NEPA to include all relevant material in agency files, whether
or not disclosed in the EIS, and all relevant material readily available to the
agency "had it fulfilled its statutory responsibilities." 361 F. Supp. at 95.
78. Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d at
1115 [2 ERC 1779] (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). In
Brown v. United States, 396 F.2d 989, 994 (Ct. Cl. 1968), the Court observed
that receipt of evidence de novo "should depend . . . on the insight gained from
a hard look at the judicial function vis-A-vis the administrative role in that par-
ticular category of case."
79. Recently there has been evidence of a judicial attitude to approach section
102(2) compliance strictly as a procedural question. See, e.g., Lathan v. Brine-
gar, 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC 1048] (9th Cir. 1974). See also cases cited at note
36 supra. But cf. Morningside Renewal Council v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 482
F.2d 234, 238 [5 ERC 1707] (2d Cir. 1973), where the court declined to over-
rule an agency determination that no EIS was necessary, finding that the deci-
sion was supported by substantial evidence.
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pect that courts will refuse such evidence, NEPA requirements
might well be rendered ineffectual.
In Overton Park, the Supreme Court called for a "plenary"
hearing, involving the full administrative record plus such addi-
tional evidence as is necessary fully to explain the agency action. 0
This scope of review may be too restrictive for NEPA, however.
Under NEPA, a reviewing court should be concerned with more
than an explanation of agency reasoning, since it must determine
if the record before it is inaccurate or deficient, and whether there
have been procedural shortcomings not reflected in that record.
The reviewing court should require appropriate testimony, sub-
ject to cross-examination, in order to establish whether or not
there has in fact been compliance with NEPA.
If NEPA is entirely a procedural mandate, as suggested in
Lathan v. Brinegar," a broad scope of review is certainly in or-
der, since the reviewing court will not be confined to applying the
arbitrary and capricious test to the agency record.
If NEPA is to be truly viable, reviewing courts should not
apply any rigid formula to limit the scope of review under NEPA.
Setting unduly restrictive limits on plaintiffs' proof of procedural
or substantive deficiencies can serve no purpose except to ham-
string the courts. Full, good-faith compliance with NEPA, en-
couraged by strict judicial supervision, is best assured if the courts
are receptive to any relevant evidence of a violation.
The scope of review should assist, and not prevent, the con-
duct of "a thorough, probing, in-depth review" 2 of the facts in
each case. It is therefore submitted that the conventional stand-
ards of relevancy are the appropriate boundary for the scope of
NEPA review. For example, when the sole question before the
court is one which concerns the procedural regularity of the
EIS-that is, whether all of the procedural requirements for draft-
ing and circulating the EIS have been met-the court may not
require any evidence beyond the document itself in order properly
to resolve the matter. However, in cases which raise broader
questions, particularly under section 101 of NEPA, a lengthy and
full scale evidentiary hearing may be essential to effective judi-
cial review.88
80. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971).
81. 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC 1048] (9th Cir. 1974) (en bane).
82. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415
(1971).
83. The court authorized such a hearing in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231 [6 ERC 1074] (W.D. Mo. 1973). The Army Corps
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It appears that the courts generally have been flexible in de-
fining the scope of NEPA review. Many have conducted eviden-
tiary hearings which go beyond the full record plus explanation
suggested in Overton Park.4  They have received de novo evi-
dence when it seemed appropriate to resolve the issues raised. In
other words, these courts have determined the scope of review
"by an evaluation of the individual factors converging on the pro-
blem of review in that specific kind of suit."85
In summary, it is plain that a court should not hesitate to ac-
cept de novo evidence, when appropriate, in a NEPA case. If
a broad and flexible scope of review bounded only by traditional
principles of relevancy is employed, there will be no need to
evolve separate rules for the scope of review in procedural and
substantive challenges. An additional consideration is that limit-
ing the scope and nature of review, and thereby shielding NEPA
violations, would offend the congressional policy articulated in
section 102(1).6
If the scope of judicial review is to be governed by estab-
lished rules of relevancy, the next question that arises is, what
should be the standard of judicial review?
of Engineers' decision to proceed with a hydraulic plant at the Truman Dam and
the adequacy of the EIS filed were challenged by EDF. The court conducted
plenary evidence hearings before finding the EIS adequate and the decision to pro-
ceed with the project not violative of NEPA.
84. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231
[6 ERC 1074] (W.D. Mo. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 371
F. Supp. 1004 [6 ERC 1008] (E.D. Tenn. 1973), a! 'd, 492 F.2d 466 [6 ERC
1362] (6th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 [5 ERC 17371
(W.D. Tex. 1973). In Sierra Club v. Lynn, the court had ruled that "the facts
would be assembled in a hearing more nearly resembling a trial de novo than a
substantial evidence proceeding...." Id. at 837-38. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN
THE COURTS 105 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON], argues that de novo
review under NEPA "is appropriate ...because a practical need exists for
impartial review."
85. Brown v. United States, 396 F.2d 989, 994 (Ct. Cl. 1968). The Fifth
Circuit exemplified this approach when it instructed the district court on remand
that its inquiry
must not necessarily be limited to consideration of the administrative
record, but supplemental affidavits, depositions and other proof concern-
ing the environmental impact of the project may be considered if an in-
adequate evidentiary development before the agency can be shown.
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d at 467 [4 ERC 1941] (5th Cir. 1973).
In Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 [2 ERC 1385] (D. Alas. 1971),
the court refused to allow trial de novo of all issues, but approached the questions
of standing, laches, and the applicability of NEPA de novo. It also received de
novo evidence on the issues of whether the agency failed to consider relevant fac-
tors and whether it gave weight to irrelevant factors. Id. at 115 n.34. Further-
more, the court implied that full trial de novo might be available in a proper case.
Id. at 114-1.5.
86. See note 3 supra.
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THE STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER NEPA
If failure to comply with a plain statutory command is the
gravamen of an alleged NEPA violation, then the reviewing court
need not search for the appropriate standard of review.87 The
court simply announces that it has found a patent NEPA violation,
such as a failure to prepare an EIS. The courts are continually
expanding the definition of NEPA procedural violations,88 and,
as suggested above, may eventually view all NEPA violations as
procedural, and therefore as questions of law for the courts. How-
ever, as long as courts treat NEPA as authorizing substantive judi-
cial review, s° reviewing courts must settle upon the appropriate
standard of review to apply. The courts must also resolve the
question of what standard of review to apply to the "threshold de-
termination," that is, an agency decision that no EIS is necessary.
Substantive judicial review is hedged with statutory and
judge-made limitations, presumably erected in order to discourage
judicial activism. Yet since NEPA is susceptible of being inter-
preted as a procedural statute (as seen in Lathan v. Brinegar°),
a court viewing it as such can largely avoid the troublesome ques-
tion of defining the limits of judicial review. Procedural com-
pliance is a question of law, reviewable de novo. A court which
acknowledges the availability of substantive review may be in no
better position to reach factual questions under NEPA than the
court which maintains that NEPA is only a procedural law and
defines compliance with sections 101 and 102(1) as a procedural
issue."' Furthermore, the court engaging in substantive review
labors under the restriction imposed by the rule requiring deference
to the agency's factual determinations. If the court will receive
evidence of a NEPA violation, then it is of little moment whether
that violation, if found, is characterized as substantive or pro-
cedural.
In conducting review of an agency's "threshold determina-
tion" a court will always be confronted with a choice between re-
87. See Wyoming Outdoor Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 [5 ERC
1844] (10th Cir. 1973). Since failure to obey a statutory command was charac-
terized as a purely legal question, the court simply directed the agency to
comply. "Our function as a reviewing court is to determine de novo 'all relevant
questions of law'...." Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828 [4 ERC 1785]
(2d Cir. 1972).
88. See cases cited at notes 54-60 supra. In Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291 [6 ERC 1305]
(D.D.C. 1974), the court held that failure to alter an EIS in response to agency
comments is a violation of NEPA.
89. As in Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir.
1972).
90. 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC 1048] (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) rev'g in part and
aff'g in part Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 [4 ERC 1487] (W.D. Wash.
1972); see also Comment, Evolving Judicial Standards, supra note 61.
91. See Comment, Evolving Judicial Standards, supra note 63, at 1606-08.
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specting agency discretion, which means using the arbitrary and
capricious test, and fashioning a more liberal standard. The trend
thus far has been to give little weight to an agency's "threshold
determination" that no EIS is necessary. In Hanly v. Kleindienst,
the Second Circuit undertook what amounts to de novo review of
a "threshold determination," reasoning that the meaning of "signi-
ficantly"0 2 is a question of law. 3  The Fifth and Eighth Circuits
measure agency threshold determinations by a standard of "rea-
sonableness," not by the arbitrary and capricious rule, since the
threshold decision is a "jurisdiction-type" question, necessitating
more searching reviewf 4
Judicial scrutiny of NEPA procedural deficiencies must be
strict and all-embracing, notwithstanding lip service paid to a
"presumption of regularity." 95  There are some courts which ap-
parently believe that less than full procedural compliance is re-
quired. However, these decisions which implicitly repudiate the
"strict standard of compliance" called for in Calvert Cliffs',96 and
which run counter to the majority of NEPA decisions, are of
doubtful authority.97  They reflect a willingness to defer to agen-
cies on questions of law, which the courts cannot do.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970) provides in part:
[All agencies of the Federal Government shall-] [i]nclude in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement. . . . (emphasis added).
93. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828-31 (2d Cir. 1972). The court
noted that the interpretation of "significantly" presents a mixed fact-law question,
and that the rational basis standard of review employed in NLRB v. Hearst Pub-
lications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), might therefore be appropriate. However, it
thought that Overton Park required the use of the APA's arbitrary and capricious
test, which involves de novo review of questions of law.
See Comment, NEPA, Environmental Impact Statements and the Hanly Liti-
gation: To File or Not to File, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 522 (1973). Several district
courts have held that the threshold decision of whether or not an EIS is required
will be reviewed de novo, since it is entirely a question of law. See Kisner v.
Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 [4 ERC 1692] (N.D.W. Va. 1972); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 [3 ERC 1883], modified, 4 ERC
1657 (E.D.N.C. 1972), remanded, 4 ERC 1659 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd on rehear-
ing 355 F. Supp. 280 [5 ERC 1001] (E.D.N.C. 1973); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F.
Supp. 882, 886 [3 ERC 1586, 1588] (W.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1027
[4 ERC 1435] (7th Cir. 1972) (in affirming, the circuit court did not find it
necessary to pass on the correctness of the trial court's holding that de novo
review of the threshold determination is appropriate).
94. See, e.g., Minnesota PIRG v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Save
Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 466 [4 ERC 1941, 1943] (5th Cir. 1973);
accord, Wyoming Outdoor Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir.
1973); United States v. Three tracts of Land, 7 ERC 1060 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
95. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415
(1971).
96. Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
97. E.g., Life of the Land v. Volpe, 363 F. Supp. 1171 [5 ERC 1413] (D.
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By accepting the notion that all NEPA questions are "pro-
cedural" the courts can eliminate the present uncertainty about
which standard of review is appropriate. Since the duties imposed
by sections 102(2)(A), (2)(B) and (2)(D), to use interdisciplin-
ary methods to give appropriate consideration to environmental
values, and to develop and describe alternatives, are "action-
forcing, '9 8 failure to comply is a procedural violation, presenting
a question of law.99 Failure to prepare an adequate EIS has also
been approached as a question of law. Thus, the next logical step
would be judicial recognition that, for purposes of review, the duty
of the agency "to consider and give effect to the environmental
goals set forth"'10 in NEPA is a procedural question. Treating
section 101(b) and 102(1) compliance as a procedural question
could give a court at least as much room to consider fact issues
as would the substantive review approach, since in rendering deci-
sions involving NEPA, courts have tended to conduct de novo
review of procedural questions. 0 '
It is consistent with sound construction of the statute to clas-
sify both sections 101(b) and 102(1) as procedural. Although
the duties prescribed under section 101(b) are much broader in
Hi. 1973), aff'd, 485 F.2d 460 [5 ERC 1780] (9th Cir. 1973); Cape Henry Bird
Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 [5 ERC 1283] (W.D. Va. 1973), aft'd, 484
F.2d 453 [6 ERC 1336] (4th Cir. 1973).
ANDERSON, supra note 84, at 52, explains the results in Bucklein v. Volpe,
[2 ERC 1082] (N.D. Cal. 1970), Citizens to Preserve Foster Park v. Volpe, 335
F. Supp. 873 [3 ERC 1031] (N.D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 991 [4 ERC 1522]
(7th Cir. 1972), and Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 [2 ERC 1385]
(D. Alas. 1971), by saying: "These cases may best be seen as exemplifying
the uncertainty that surrounded early efforts at implementation ....
The Ninth Circuit seems reluctant to insist on strict NEPA compliance. In
National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 5 ERC 1863 (9th Cir. 1973), the
court refused to overturn a land exchange, although conceding a NEPA violation,
because the violation was not "prejudicial." Id. at 1865. Cf. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 [4 ERC 1933] (9th Cir. 1973). But see,
Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC 1048] (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc),
rev'g in part, aff'g in part Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 [4 ERC 1487]
(W.D. Wash. 1972); City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150,
159-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Oddly enough, the only authority cited by the Ninth Circuit in support of
its invocation of a prejudicial error rule was Calvert Cliffs'. The result in Na-
tional Forest Preservation Group may be explained by the court's reluctance to
upset an executed transaction, but it cannot be harmonized with Calvert Cliffs.
98. 115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969).
99. See cases cited in notes 54-60 supra.
100. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 [4 ERC
1721] (8th Cir. 1972).
101. See cases cited at notes 54-60 supra, and cf. Wyoming Outdoor Coord.
Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1248 [5 ERC 1844, 1846] (10th Cir. 1973)
where the court said:
The Court's ultimate determination that the statute's requirements had
not been violated must be reviewed on appeal as essentially a legal con-
clusion, and not a fact finding subject to the clearly erroneous rule.
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scope than the requirements of section 102(2), they are equally
mandatory. The fundamental question should be whether the re-
viewing court deems itself capable of policing the broad goals of
section 101, not whether section 101 involves agency discretion.
This very question has been answered affirmatively by courts
which label compliance with sections 101 and 102(1) as a "sub-
stantive" issue.1°2
Why then have most courts stopped short of categorizing
section 101 as procedural? Surely, as the Ninth Circuit has rec-
ognized in Lathan v. Brinegar,103 the language of the statute
does not stand in the way. The architecture of the statute, which
not only imposes specific procedural requirements, such as those
prescribed in section 102(2)(C), but -also requires agencies to
amend their decision-making processes and even their rules and
regulations,' is consistent with a procedural characterization of
section 101.
Perhaps the explanation is simply that in the technical and
rapidly expanding field of environmental law, the courts are still
reluctant to accept responsibility for broad review under sections
102(1) and 101. The courts may detect a more substantial com-
ponent of agency discretion in these provisions than in section
102(2), not enough to trigger the exemption for "agency action
...committed to agency discretion by law," 10 5 but sufficient to
counsel more deference to the agency decision than is necessary
in the case of section 102(2) review. But as the courts acquire
more experience with NEPA review, they should become less
hesitant to hold agencies to strict compliance with all of NEPA.
A court taking the next logical step of classifying these provi-
sions as procedural will enjoy more latitude in examining the fact
of compliance, than if it were to employ the APA arbitrary and
capricious standard. And the real goal of judicial review under
NEPA-whether labeled substantive or procedural-is, after all, to
ascertain the fact of agency compliance.
CONCLUSION
The Overton Park formula gives a court ample room to
reject environmentally unwise decisions, even though the court
must be careful not "to substitute its judgment for that of the
102. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 [4 ERC
1721] (8th Cir. 1972).
103. 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC 1048] (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970); see note 3 supra.
105. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
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agency."106 Review which extends to an examination of whether
all relevant factors have been duly considered and given proper
weight, and whether any irrelevant factors have entered into the
agency's decision, is broad indeed. Many agency decisions involv-
ing major federal projects are probably vulnerable to attack under
this test.10 7
NEPA affords the courts an opportunity to apply even
broader standards of review to agency decisions. Under NEPA,
the judiciary has claimed for itself a major role in shaping agen-
cies' decision-making processes relating to "major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.""',
The courts have done so by reviewing compliance with NEPA pro-
cedures de novo, and by reading sections 101 and 102(1) as sup-
porting substantive review. Whether the courts will continue to
play this role depends upon their willingness to broaden the de-
finition of those elements of NEPA which are regarded as pro-
cedural, and their willingness to go behind the administrative
record to scrutinize the real workings of decisionmaking. As dis-
cussed in this article, a major step in this direction was taken by
the Ninth Circuit in Lathan v. Brinegar.0 It is submitted that
much of the present confusion and uncertainty surrounding NEPA
could be alleviated if the Ninth Circuit's suggestion that NEPA
is entirely "procedural" were to be accepted by the other federal
courts.
De novo judicial review of the fact of NEPA compliance is,
of course, both appropriate and necessary, regardless of whether
such review is labeled substantive or procedural. Reviewing
courts must be prepared to pierce the formal agency record, and
even to disbelieve it," 0 in searching out NEPA violations. The
106. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971).
107. This is so because it is apparent that agencies by and large have not yet
been able to overcome institutional biases which predispose them to give too little
weight to the environment in their decisionma-king, and too much weight to other
factors. For example, the Federal Highway Administration tends to make its deci-
sions on the basis of what is best for the automobile, the Corps of Engineers is pre-
occupied with flood control, the Forest Service thinks in terms of commercial tim-
ber harvest, and the Fedetal Power Commission believes it must facilitate the ex-
ploitation of energy resources. These biases of mission-oriented agencies are the re-
sult of Congressional directives, administrative policy, and time-honored habit.
They are well-insulated by inertia.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
109. 506 F.2d 677 [7 ERC 1048] (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
110. The decision in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 355 F.
Supp. 280 [5 ERC 1001] (E.D.N.C. 1973) is an example of vigilant judicial
policing of NEPA. The court found that the EIS (1) failed to consider impor-
tant environmental effects, (2) misrepresented the nature of other environmental
effects, and (3) failed to disclose and discuss alternatives; it therefore concluded:
"This court finds as a fact that the final Chicod Creek Watershed Environmental
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judiciary must closely scrutinize not only the methodology of
the agency, but also the thought processes that resulted in its
decision. Judicial policing of agency compliance also requires
that courts examine the propriety of the weight given to various
factors, and the "balance struck" '' by the agency. The courts'
willingness to resolve these fact issues pertaining to compliance,
more than anything else, will determine the future effectiveness
of judicial review under NEPA. The courts have the responsi-
bility, and the means at their command, to see to it that agencies
fully comply with NEPA. Congress may pass environmental
legislation, but the workings of government are such that only
sustained judicial vigilance can guarantee that the mandate of law
is translated into agency action. The courts should not sacrifice
NEPA's effectiveness by relying on the nice, but artificial distinc-
tion between "procedural" and "substantive" to draw back from
judicial review of the fact of NEPA compliance.
Statement does not fully and adequately disclose the adverse environmental effects
of the ... Project; nor ... adequately disclose or discuss reasonable alternatives
to the Project .... (emphasis added). Id. at 289. But some courts have been
reluctant to go behind the record other than for the limited purpose of applying
the arbitrary and capricious test. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Arm-
strong, 356 F. Supp. 131 [5 ERC 1153] (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 814
[6 ERC 10681 (9th Cir. 1973). One court refused to weigh the evidence con-
tradicting an EIS, saying:
It is simply unrealistic for plaintiffs in this case to assume that this
or any other court is going to make findings of fact which would attempt
to resolve the conflicts between data contained and relied upon in thefinal EIS which may conflict with data which plaintiffs believe is more
reliable.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 240 [6 ERC 1079] (8th
Cir. 1973).
111. Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1115 [2 ERC 1779] (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
